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Derivation of Safety Verification Conditions from Hazard Definitions


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
Air Traffic Management (ATM)

- ◆ Raytheon Systems Canada Ltd.
- ◆ Real-time information system
- ◆ Large scale Ada system
 - 700,000 production SLOC + COTS
- ◆ Modern architecture
 - Object-oriented, layered, distributed


Air Traffic Management (ATM) System



Chemical Factory Management (CFM) System



System Safety Engineering



- ◆ Identification, analysis and elimination or control of system hazards

CFM Safety

- ◆ **Accidents**
 - e.g., Vessel rupture, fire or explosion
- ◆ **System Hazards**
 - e.g., An “invalid” temperature, D , is displayed for vessel V at time T
- ◆ **Hazard Analysis**
 - e.g., temperature value is stale or corrupted


Safety Verification

Source
Code




System
Hazard

?



Safety Verification Case




Semantic Gap

System Hazard


Source Code

- ◆ end-user terminology
 - temperature, vessel
- ◆ abstract relationships
 - invalid temperature
- ◆ temporal relationships
 - “at some time T ...”
- ◆ programmer’s lexicon
 - abstract classes
- ◆ concrete relationships
 - arithmetic, logical
- ◆ causal relationships
 - program execution

Hazard Refinement



Generate system SVCs: CFM



Source Code Level SVCs

- ◆ Verifiable Code Assertions
 - Feasibility of code verification tools
 - e.g., SPARK Examiner
- ◆ Formal source code level SVCs
 - Formalizing object-oriented software
 - e.g., Typed, predicate logic

References

- ◆ <http://www.cs.ubc.ca/formalWARE/safety.htm>
- ◆ Generating Safety Verification Conditions By Means of Reductio Ad Absurdum, ISSC'98 (to appear)
- ◆ Refinement of Safety-Related Hazards into Verifiable Code Assertions, SAFECOMP'98 (to appear)
- ◆ Formalization of Safety Verification Conditions, 1st ROOM Workshop (to appear)
- ◆ Ensuring the Inspectability, Maintainability and Repeatability of the Safety Verification of a Critical System, UBC Technical Report 98-06
- ◆ Looking at Code With Your Safety Goggles On, Ada-Europe'98